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Finland's membership in the European Union is a pragmatic line of action in security policy. EU membership gives Finland new opportunities for influencing change and stability in its security environment. The importance of membership for Finnish security depends on Finland's own contribution. Finland's military security remains its own responsibility.
As a member of the EU, Finland has full powers and opportunities for influencing the decisions taken in a community of democratic states aiming to build lasting security.
Since the end of the East West division, the policy of neutrality that Finland followed in the Cold War is no longer a viable line of action. During the Cold War, Finland tried to avoid making political, and especially military, commitments that might have drawn it into conflicts between the great powers. In the new situation, Finland's strategy is an active participation in international political and security cooperation for prevention and resolution of security problems.
Finland has not made any security policy reservations concerning its obligations under its founding treaties or the Maastricht Treaty. Finland has joined the Union as a militarily nonaligned country which wishes to play an active and constructive role in creating and implementing a common foreign and security policy.
The EU is not a military alliance, nor is it an independent actor in the field of defence. Those EU Member States that also belong to NATO manage their defence through the collective defence offered by NATO, while the militarily nonaligned member states rely on an independent defence. Despite the provisions of its founding charter, the WEU is not a fullscale military alliance; the common defence of its members is managed in coordination with NATO and in practice relies on NATO's military structures and resources.
Military nonalignment is no obstacle to Finland's pursuit of its membership objectives, or to the fulfilment of its undertakings. No such conflict can be found either in the clauses of the Maastricht Treaty or in Finland's experiences or prospects as a member.
Finland's contribution to conflict prevention and crisis management strengthens the Union's capacity to promote cooperative security in Europe. Finland's credible independent defence capability is an important contribution to the Union's common security. Finland will play a constructive role in consideration of the defence issue within the Union, decisions concerning which will be made unanimously among the member states. Finland is convinced that its own interests and those of the other member states can be reconciled on this issue.
It is by remaining outside military alliances that Finland under the present circumstances can best support stability in northern Europe and thus more widely on the continent as a whole. Considering the special historical relationship between Sweden and Finland and the similar interests in their vicinity, Sweden's security policy has always been an extremely important factor in Finnish security.
The European Union's goal is to safeguard the common values and interests and independence of the Union, and to strengthen the security of the Union and all its member states in all ways. A capable and unified European Union in which the interests of all member states are taken equally into account will strengthen Finnish security. Union membership will help Finland repel any military threats and prevent attempts to exert political pressure.
As an independent state, Finland will defend its political sovereignty and territorial integrity. Under the UN Charter, Finland can request the assistance and support of other countries if it becomes the object of aggression.
The European Union pursues a common foreign and security policy in order to attain the common objectives of its members. Under the Maastricht Treaty, the common foreign and security policy shall include all questions related to the security of the European Union. Within the Union's second intergovernmental pillar, the member states have enhanced and expanded the foreign policy cooperation begun during the Community era. In the longer term, the Treaty allows the EU a common defence policy and a common defence.
The common defence adopted as the Union's longterm goal in the Maastricht Treaty continues to generate public debate, but there are as yet in sight no prospects of it coming about. The primary task of the Union's defence dimension in the short term is to develop a capability for crisis management. The means to this are the strengthening of the WEU's operational and structural capabilities.
The security policy solutions made by Finland provide an adequate foundation for involvement in international cooperation for crisis management. The framework for Finnish action comprises its EU membership, its observer status in the WEU its Partnership for Peace with NATO, and its OSCE and UN membership. Finland's actual contribution in practice will depend on its own decisions and the country's determination and capacity.
Finland's security policy derives from a national security assessment and national decisionmaking. The national policies extend to all issues of foreign relations.
Through the Union, the member states pursue a systematic policy of taking stands on international disputes and conflicts, and of coordination and collaboration in international organizations. The objects of a joint Union action include the Pact on Stability in Europe and election monitoring, in arms control the extension of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, and OSCE projects such as strengthening cooperation between the OSCE and the UN.
Foreign and security policy cooperation within the Union is an intergovernmental matter which is normally implemented by unanimous decisions and solutions of the member states. Their common values and similar goals and interests in building up a European security order are the basis for unity and mutual solidarity between the member states. By sharing in these collective efforts, Finland can expect support from other members for its own aspirations and for its position.
Finland's experiences as a member of the Union show that Finnish security interests can be reconciled with the Union's common interests.
Finland has had no difficulty in concurring with the common stands and joint measures on which the members of the Union have attained unanimity. Finland has made an active contribution to the Union's joint strategy on Russia, which aims at building a lasting partnership between the EU and a democratic Russia. Finland has been able to participate in and concur with the Union's action in the Chechen crisis, where the Union has called upon Russia to observe the norms and obligations it has endorsed, as a condition for putting into force the partnership and cooperation agreement with the Union. Finland has won support from the Union for its own, and the Nordic, line of action in consolidating the independence of the Baltic states, in supporting their political and economic reforms and in opening for them the perspective of Union membership.
The security policy significance of EU membership for Finland depends not only on the Union's capability but also, and crucially, on Finland's own capability and activeness as a Union member. In terms of Finnish security, strategically important objects for cooperation in the future will be to enhance the capabilities of the OSCE and to build a cooperative security order in Europe, to create an EU strategy on Russia, and to expand the Union into Central Europe and the Baltics.
Finland supports consolidation of the EU's crisis management capacity. Finland is preparing to contribute constructively to debate on the future of the Union's and WEU's institutional relations.
The goal of Finland's defence is to guarantee the country's independence, secure the livelihood of its citizens, prevent Finnish territory from being seized and secure the functioning of the state leadership. Finland's defence solution is based on territorial defence and a large reserve army founded on general conscription.
Credible national defence is the best way to guarantee that Finnish territory will not become the object of military speculation, or that a war will not result from the threat of military force in even minor crises. The entire territory of the country will be defended. The creation of capabilities for receiving assistance in a crisis situation is taken into consideration in developing Finland's defence.
The President of the Republic is the Supreme Commander of the Defence Forces. The Government Committee on Foreign and Security Policy is the highest consultative and planning body on defence matters. Its members are the ministers responsible for national security, the Prime Minister acting as its chairman. The President may attend the meetings. As a part of the Council of State, the Ministry of Defence is responsible for national defence policy, as well as international defence cooperation.
The Chief of Defence leads the Defence Forces, which are responsible for securing the territorial integrity of the country, and the defence of the nation and its military preparedness in general. Administratively, the Defence Forces are under the Ministry of Defence. In respect to operational orders, the Chief of Defence is directly responsible to the President.
In addition to military defence, the concept of total defence includes measures concerning national economy, civil defence, the media, social welfare, communications and civil order. In accordance with the 1991 State of Readiness Act, the defence of the nation is shared among several different administrative sectors.
The country is divided into three commands and 12 military provinces, a structure that ensures the whole territory is defended. The most important tasks of the Defence Forces are surveillance of the nation's land, sea and air spaces, securing territorial integrity and, if necessary, the defence of the country.
According to Finnish law, all male citizens between the ages of 18 and 60 are under obligation to carry out military service. The conscripts serve either a period of twelve (12), nine (9) or six (6) months. Each year more than 80% of those called up complete their national service. An essential part of national service is military training of reservists. In accordance with a law passed in 1995, it is possible for women to volunteer for military service, and 400-500 women do so annually.
Finland's wartime defence is based on mobilised forces. The general development in Europe, including the environs of Finland, has made a reduction in the strength of Defence Forces possible, provided the technical level of the remaining forces is raised. The reductions in the Defence Forces wartime strength will be continued, bringing the maximum strength down to 350,000 men by the end of 2008.
In developing Finland's defence system, priority will be given to the command and control system, the Army's readiness formations, military crisis management capacity and the wartime economy arrangements in the information society.
Finland spends about 1.4 % of its GDP on military defence. An essential part of the Defence Forces' capability is its materiel preparedness, and about one third of defence expenditure is spent on procurement.
Finland's military crisis management capacity is developed to meet the crisis management objectives of the European Union and the UN, the primary tool being the NATO Planning and Review Process (PARP). Development of the troops and systems of the Finnish Defence Forces for crisis management purposes will be of benefit to national defence. Finland can participate in military crisis management operations implemented by the UN, the OSCE, the EU or NATO, provided these operations are under a UN or OSCE mandate consistent with the provisions of the Finnish Act on Peace Support Operations. Finland may have up to 2,000 peacekeepers in operations at any one time.
The Ministry for Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Defence are responsible for military crisis management preparations, guidance and supervision. The Defence Forces are responsible for practical implementation.
Finland's first priority is to take part in EU-led Peace Support Operations in the Nordic framework. The Nordic Countries have developed the concept of a common pool of forces for military crisis management within the framework of the Nordic Coordinated Arrangement for Military Peace Support (NORDCAPS). ´Our common Nordic aim is to create, by the year 2003, a Nordic force package up to brigade level for Peace Support Operations. These troops could be used in both EU and NATO-led operations, as well as UN and possible OSCE-led operations´.
Finland cooperates with NATO in numerous ways. Finland signed the Partnership for Peace (PfP) Framework Document in May 1994 and joined the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) in June 1997. Finland supports the strengthening of the PfP and the participation of Partners in the planning of crisis management operations.
Within the PfP Finland has taken part in the Planning and Review Process (PARP) since February 1995. The Planning and Review Process is for Finland the central tool for developing military interoperability and it helps to facilitate the evaluation and development of the capabilities of forces to cooperate in crisis management operations.
Finland's participation in PARP and in other cooperative efforts with NATO has two conditions: in the prevailing politico-security situation Finland remains militarily non-allied and maintains a credible national defence. Through cooperation, the preconditions for international crisis management are created, as well as the possibility of influencing European security structures in the national interest.
Today, Finland is not aspiring to NATO membership. However, close and constructive cooperation with the Alliance is high on the Finnish agenda. While such cooperation promotes European crisis management capabilities, it also enhances Finland's interoperability with other nations and thus indirectly improves its national defence.
From the perspective of Finland, the European Union, Russia and NATO are the central actors in security development in Europe. They are all in a state of transformation and affect security and stability in Finland's environs in northern Europe. Finland supports the stability of northern Europe and of the entire continent by maintaining and developing a national defence, which is credible relative to its security environment.
During the preparatory phase of the Intergovernmental Conference (IGC), which later led to the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1997, Finland and Sweden took an active role to include the so-called Petersberg tasks (humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peace enforcement) in the tasks of the European Union. The Finnish-Swedish initiative paved the way for developing the Common European Security and Defence Policy in the Cologne and Helsinki European Council meetings in 1999.
Finland supports a strong EU and participates constructively in developing the Union's security and defence policy. Finland's commitment in developing the EU's crisis management capabilities complements the work already done for years with the UN and through NATO's Partnership for Peace Programme. While Finland continues to closely co-operate with these organisations, it also contributes to the EU's possibilities to prevent and react to crises and thus to strengthening the EU's position as an international actor (from Security and defence policy, written for Virtual Finland by Janne Kuusela, adviser; Ministry of Defence, International Defence Policy Unit).
Among the factors affecting Finland's security, Russia clearly is one of the most significant. Russia has been a key part of the European security landscape for centuries and continues to be one today. The Finnish-Russian border is 1,300 kilometers long, and Finland wants to keep it a border of peace and cooperation. By integrating Russia into the network of multilateral international cooperation, we will be making a valuable contribution to European as well as international security.
Finland does not believe that Russia would increase its security, nor make its neighbors more safe, by isolating itself from the rest of Europe. For this reason Finland some time ago supported Russian membership in the Council of Europe. For
the same reason Finland is now actively participating in European Union-sponsored assistance programs in Russia.
I also believe that the first round of Russian presidential elections was a victory for democratic development in Russia. It is another contribution to stability in all of Europe. When stability and predictability inside Russia increase, the chances for more intensive cooperation increase as well. For one thing, this means that such open issues as NATO enlargement, the stipulations of the CFE treaty, and Russia's relations with its neighbors, especially with the Baltic States, can be a matter of negotiation, not one of confrontation (from Security in a Changing Europe: A Finnish View Minister of Defense of Finland Anneli Taina).
Four main conclusions can be drawn from the preceding analysis of Finnish and Swedish security.
First, even though Finland and Sweden are neighbours and share histories and values, they have had different perceptions of security and they pursued different security policies in the inter-war period as well as during the Cold War even though the countries were known as the Nordic neutrals.
Second, much has changed since 1989. As a result of the end of the Cold War, the Finnish and Swedish security policies are today in many respects closer to each other than they have ever been before.
Third, geopolitics explains many of the differences and similarities between Swedish and Finnish security policies. Despite the geographical and cultural affinity, geopolitics divided Finland and Sweden for the greater part of the twentieth century. The single most important factor was the Soviet Union. In fact, it is impossible to understand the policies pursued by Sweden and Finland without taking into consideration the strength and security interests of the eastern great power. The geopolitical shift caused by the collapse of the Soviet Union and its effect, in particular, on Finland's international position have created more equal opportunities for Swedish and Finnish security policies. Still, even though the Cold War is now over, the presence of Russia influences Northern European security and makes it distinct from security in many other regions of Europe. Russia has retreated from its historical position in Central Europe and is now far removed from the Balkans, but it is still very much a neighbour to the Nordic and Baltic states.
Fourth, even though the Nordic "sisters" pursued different policies in the inter-war period and during the Cold War, Swedish and Finnish securities were firmly interrelated.
Because of the geographical affinity, Swedish policy affected Finnish security and vice versa. Both countries took this relationship into consideration while shaping their respective policies. This interdependence still exists today. To some extent, it now also includes the Baltic states.
Both Finland and Sweden have committed themselves to the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the Union. As a consequence, neutrality has de facto been redefined in both countries to mean military non-alignment. Finland and Sweden take part in the deepening of the CFSP and in the development of the ESDF but they draw a distinction between crisis management and common defence. While the former is to be developed and pursued, the latter remains unacceptable to them. Maintaining the status of military non-alignment also determines policies towards NATO. Sweden and Finland regard the presence of the US and NATO in Northern Europe as important factors for balancing Russian power and they co-operate increasingly with the Alliance, but they have no intention of joining NATO at the moment. Public opinion remaining decidedly sceptical towards NATO membership is, for both, one of the key factors behind this policy.
Still, Russia remains important for Finnish and Swedish security. It is in the interests of both Sweden and Finland to work against new dividing lines emerging in Northern Europe. The reinforcement of the independence and international position of the Baltic states is also in the interest of Sweden and Finland, and both are pushing for Baltic EU memberships.
The geopolitical shift caused by the end of the Cold War changed the relationship between Finland and Sweden. Due to EU membership, Finland is no longer that dependent on Sweden and the countries can formulate their security policies more as equal partners. While Finland has moved to where Sweden has been for a long time, the Baltic states may now seem to have taken Finland's former place in this relationship.
The Baltics need Finland and Sweden for their security and the strengthening of Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian independence. The Integration of the Baltic states into the European and transatlantic institutions is in the interest also of Finland and Sweden.
The independence of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania increases Finland's and Sweden's strategic distance from Russia. The reinforcement of their international position helps to avoid conflicts between the Baltic states and Russia, which could also easily affect Swedish and Finnish security. Much like the Swedish policy towards Finland during the Cold War, Finland and Sweden are now trying to strengthen their own security by strengthening the security of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. They assist the Baltic states to help themselves - also by developing self-defence capabilities, push for their integration into Europe, and avoid taking measures that could complicate the position of the Baltic states.
One of the constraints for Finnish and Swedish NATO membership has stemmed from the position of the Baltic states. Were Finland and Sweden to join NATO without the Baltic states, it could be assumed to increase Russian pressure on the Baltic states and consequently decrease Swedish and Finnish security. Even if Sweden and Finland recognise the importance of Baltic independence to their security, they are not willing to commit themselves to take responsibility for the security of the Baltic states. Finland and Sweden do not consider themselves capable of taking on such a responsibility and emphasise, therefore, the importance of linking Baltic Sea security to European and transatlantic security.
Given recent developments, such as the possibility of NATO heading for a "Big Bang" enlargement process towards the East starting in 2002, the Nordics should obviously not put up (or be seen as putting up) obstacles in the way of Baltic NATO membership.
Despite the increasing similarity between the Finnish and Swedish security policies, there are still differences. Sweden shifted somewhat earlier than Finland towards open support for Baltic independence and by first taking the decision to apply for EU membership, while Finland seems to have moved ahead of Sweden later in integrating itself into the EU and in establishing links with NATO. Today, however, both countries co-operate extensively with NATO, with Sweden now going full speed ahead in converting its Cold War anti-invasion defence into a flexible and fully NATO compatible national and international projection force.
While Sweden strongly underlined three issues – enlargement of the Union, engaging EU citizens in the activities and future of the Union, and environmental issues, to be handled by the Union members together - Finland sees itself putting more emphasis than Sweden on deepening the EU and in belonging to the core of the Union.
Geopolitics and historical experiences help to explain these differences. Finland has a long border with Russia, whose future is uncertain, and changes in Russia would more directly affect Finland than Sweden.
Seeking protection is one of the motivations of Finland's policy on the EU and NATO. Membership of the EU, deepening the Union and co-operation with NATO, while still retaining the basic structure of its anti-invasion defence, are regarded in Finland as useful means to move the relationship with Russia into a multilateral context, to create reciprocity and to prepare for receiving outside assistance.
The Swedish emphasis on enlargement reflects a gradual understanding as a means by which to handle the Baltic Sea security problems, i.e. securing a European home for the Baltic states. The Union thus provides an instrument for regional stability and security building. While Finland may not regard joining NATO as a rational step due to the Russian negative reaction, military alliances per se do not belong to the Swedish vision of a better all-European security system.
In brief, although Finland and Sweden have taken similar steps in their security policies since the Cold War, the motivations for their policies are not entirely identical. The future relationship between Finnish and Swedish security policies will depend on their membership of the European Union. The relationship between their security policies will, however, also depend on the situation in Russia. If Russia moves closer to Europe and becomes a benign power, it is probable that the common elements in the two security policies - based upon their common history and geographical affinity -will be emphasised. If, on the other hand, things start to go fundamentally wrong in Russia, Finland and Sweden may be more likely to drift apart with their security policy choices. (from Finnish and Swedesh Security- Comparing National Policies, Bo Huldt, Teija Tiilikainen, Tapani Vaahtoranta and Anna Helkama-Rågård)
Sources:
1. Security and defence policy, written for Virtual Finland by Janne Kuusela, adviser; Ministry of Defence, International Defence Policy Unit;
2. Security in a Changing Europe: A Finnish View Minister of Defense of Finland Anneli Taina;
3. Finnish and Swedesh Security- Comparing National Policies, Bo Huldt, Teija Tiilikainen, Tapani Vaahtoranta and Anna Helkama-Rågård.
The Security Policy Significance of EU Membership for Finland I. The European Union and Finnish Security Finland's membership in the European Union is a pragmatic line of action in security policy. EU membership gives Finland new opportunities for i
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